Haitian police say they found the burned vehicle in which four Salvadoran aviation technicians were believed to be traveling when they were ambushed on October 18. They found no sign of the men. By then, President Nayib Bukele had sent more than 2,000 troops to Haiti, and a deployment prompted by the search for four missing men had become part of a broader offensive against armed gangs.
The burned vehicle is evidence of what happened to the vehicle. As evidence of what happened to the men, it is circumstantial. The public record establishes that they were reported missing. It offers no conclusive proof that they were kidnapped or killed. Secondhand claims deserve to be treated as such, even when they make for a more dramatic headline. Haiti should help find the men and welcome El Salvador’s support against the gangs. The government still owes the country a public account of the authority under which those troops operate.
Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé says Haiti directs foreign forces on its territory. The United Nations says most Salvadoran personnel operate outside the framework of the Gang Suppression Force. The GSF has a UN mandate and a status agreement with Haiti. If a separate agreement covers Bukele’s additional troops, publish the provisions that define their mission, identify the Haitian authority empowered to halt an operation, and establish who investigates civilian harm. If no such agreement exists, formalize one. The prime minister’s claim of Haitian control is worth exactly what his government can enforce on the ground.
Had four Dominican service members been reported missing in Haiti and President Luis Abinader sent more than 2,000 troops across the border to recover them, some of the same people cheering Bukele would have called it an invasion before the first convoy reached Port-au-Prince. They would have demanded to see the authorization and the limits of the mission. They would have been right to demand both.
Some of us grew up learning that hating Dominicans was part of being a good Haitian. Real grievances against Dominican governments became an excuse to despise Dominican people we had never met. That prejudice shows up in the standard we apply today. We demand proof of Haitian authority when the troops come from a country we distrust and accept a prime minister’s assurance when they come from a president we admire. Spare me the patriotism lecture if your defense of Haitian sovereignty depends on whose flag is on the uniform.
The command issue matters because the Salvadorans have entered a field already crowded with armed actors. Haiti has its National Police, its Armed Forces, and the Brigade for the Security of Protected Areas, known as BSAP. The foreign actors include the GSF, Erik Prince’s private contractor Vectus Global, and Bukele’s additional troops. Their efforts should serve one objective: disrupt, degrade, and ultimately destroy the gangs. That takes more than armed men converging on the same neighborhood. It takes a Haitian-led command that can assign responsibilities, coordinate operations, and make sure arrests and seizures lead to prosecutions that dismantle the gangs’ networks.
Without that coordination, an offensive can succeed on one street and fail a town away. A gang driven out of Port-au-Prince can carry its rifles, money, and extortion network to Léogâne. One shopkeeper finally raises his shutters without paying a gang. Another starts paying to keep his doors open. Spare me the victory speech if all we’ve done is change the address on the extortion bill.
Preventing that outcome starts before the first convoy moves. The Haitian unit assigned to hold recovered territory needs officers, vehicles, and fuel. Police in nearby towns need enough warning and support to act when armed groups move into their area. Investigators need evidence they can take to court against the people who order kidnappings, supply weapons, and collect the money. These are the jobs that turn a military advance into security people can count on.
Haitians with military and law enforcement experience abroad, especially the Haitian-American Veterans Council of Organizations (HAVCO) have proposed advising Haitian commanders and helping sustain operations after the GSF and other foreign forces leave. Bring them to the table while the offensive is underway. Put them to work under Haitian authority on joint planning, intelligence sharing, logistics, and the handover of recovered districts. Waiting until foreign troops are packing to figure out who takes over would be incompetence.
Bukele’s troops can help Haiti break the gangs’ grip. Haiti’s government has to direct that effort today and be ready to hold what it recovers tomorrow. I would demand that of Abinader before his first soldier crossed the border. Bukele gets my thanks and the same standard.
Bobb Rousseau, PhD