« Martelly et la légalisation du banditisme d’État » La présence de Michel Martelly sur le territoire des États-Unis, à l’heure où ces derniers classent Haïti parmi les pays hôtes du terrorisme transnational, soulève un paradoxe fondamental : comment prétendre sanctionner un État pour sa collusion avec le crime organisé sans prendre en compte la responsabilité des dirigeants ayant institutionnalisé cette collusion ?
Martelly and the Legalization of State-Sanctioned Banditry
The political rise of Michel Joseph Martelly, elected President of Haiti in 2011, marks a critical turning point in the institutionalization of disorder as a method of governance. A controversial figure and former entertainer known by the stage name « Sweet Micky, » Martelly not only violated the traditional codes of presidential decorum; he actively transformed banditry into a functional instrument of political control, replacing the rule of law with a system of clientelist networks rooted in fear, corruption, and armed violence.
Under his administration, criminal gangs ceased to be peripheral actors and became integral tools for territorial and political management. The deliberate erosion of security policies, the progressive paralysis of the judiciary, and the frequent use of armed groups to intimidate political opponents or control popular protests offer compelling evidence of what numerous legal experts—including former Justice Minister Bernard Gousse—have described as the « programmed criminalization of executive power. » A new politico-mafia oligarchy emerged, bolstered by Martelly’s ambiguous and often public affiliations with gang leaders, recorded in videos and appearances that signaled the normalization of illegitimate power.
Violence was not merely tolerated—it was aestheticized and trivialized through an overt cultural discourse. Martelly’s music, known for its virulent misogyny and vulgarity, functioned as a vehicle for the desacralization of public authority. Vulgarity became authenticity, and brute force, a marker of political authority. Through political concerts and public statements, this cultural imagery penetrated popular consciousness and reshaped the perception of power itself, especially in urban and marginalized communities.
In this context, the continued presence of Michel Martelly on U.S. soil—at a time when the United States has designated Haiti as a host country for transnational terrorism—raises a profound normative paradox: how can one claim to sanction a state for its collusion with organized crime while turning a blind eye to the very political actors who institutionalized that collusion? Martelly has been explicitly named in a UN Security Council report for his alleged connections to gang networks deemed terrorist in nature. His potential expulsion from the United States should not be seen as political retaliation but rather as a matter of juridical and diplomatic consistency.
This case encapsulates a broader dilemma: how does one rebuild a sovereign state once a former head of state has publicly and systematically dismantled the foundations of public authority in favor of parallel criminal structures? Martelly’s legacy is not confined to a contested presidency—it symbolizes the collapse of Haiti’s social contract under the weight of impunity, cultural vulgarity, and the fusion of politics with violence. This model of governance through chaos continues to inflict long-term damage, making any diplomatic or institutional recovery contingent upon a definitive rupture with the practices and precedents established during his tenure.