



GRAVE CONCERNS REPORT

Anthropology of the Disastrous UN Resolution 2699 Featuring: Horrific Human Rights Violations; Illegal, Unconstitutional and Invalid Bilateral Agreements; False Impersonation of Head of State; Mysterious Death of Police Inspector Walter Nyankieya Nyamato; Material Support by the Biden Administration to Notorious Gang-Affiliated Ex-Prime Minister Henry, as President-for-Life, Against the Will of the Haitian People

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Symbol: S/RES/2699 (2023)

Title: Resolution 2699 (2023) / adopted by the Security Council at its 9430th meeting, on 2 October 2023

Other Title: Security Council resolution 2699 (2023) [on authorization to Member States to form and deploy a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti]

The New England Human Rights Organization (NEHRO) will argue that the Kenyan High Court's decision on the 26th day of January 2024, juxtaposed to the *fait accompli*, duly recorded at midnight, on and about the 7th day of February 2024, should compel an impartial observer to recognize, far-beyond any reasonable doubt, the caducity *ipso facto* of Resolution 2699. The latter was adopted, by the United Nations Security Council, on October 2, 2023, under the premise of an "illegal", "unconstitutional" and "invalid" agreement, knowingly and willfully concocted by Mr. William Ruto (Kenya) and Mr. Ariel Henry (Haiti). As a result, the Secretary General of the United Nations, for all intended purposes, will undoubtedly find, Resolution 2699 to be null and void.

I. Introduction

NEHRO carries out its mission in collaboration with partners across three continents (Africa, Asia, and Europe), for the protection of all human rights for all people. The organization strives to hold accountable those responsible for upholding such rights in ensuring that they are implemented, in accordance with terms of resolution 48/141 of the Assembly General.

Accordingly, there is great value in seeking to determine the appropriateness and validity of any agreement, established under national or international *corpus juris*: thereby, subjecting such agreement to a thorough review of lawfulness¹. It is a matter of legitimacy and validity associated with any UN resolution, UN resolution 2699 included, according to the universal principles that govern any contract. Under both domestic and international regimes, the elements of a contract include identification, offer, acceptance, consideration, meeting of the minds, competency/capacity, and contract legality.

Admittedly, such a review will only marginally relate to the decision to terminate the contested transaction; However, in the specific case of UN resolution 2699, it is necessary to have criteria for determining the scope *ratione temporis* of a peacekeeping operation and, by that means, to specify the date on which the nature of the "analytical grid" or legal control changes.

¹ See, M. Bedjaoui, *Mélanges Rigaux*, Bruylant, 1993 p. 11-52 ; Colloque de la SFDI sur Le Chapitre VII de la Charte, Rennes, Pedone, 1995 p. 255-297 ; *Nouvel ordre mondial et contrôle de la légalité des actes du CS*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1994, 634 p. ; voir aussi Ph. Weckel, « Le Chapitre VII de la Charte et son application par le CS. », AFDI 1991 p. 165-201, not. p. 178.

UN resolutions can change; they have changed in the past; and they will continue to change, with each successful challenge, in favor of peace and security according to the rule of law. As the evidence in this case overwhelmingly suggests, the UN resolution 2699 is subject to change. Therefore, it must be reviewed, annulled, and amended, to reflect the Kenyan High Court's decision dated January 26, 2024, juxtaposed to Haiti's reality on the ground post-February 7th, 2024.

Indeed, the time has come for the United States of America to **(1)** reverse course on Haiti; **(2)** abide to the rule of law; **(3)** reformulate a new proposal (which is not based on the same flawed legal reasoning or an illegal, unconstitutional and invalid MOU); **(4)** cease to deprive Haiti of its constitutionally-established military (**FAdH**) and stop coercing high-ranking police officers (ex: Guy Philippe and Léon Charles: being the most compelling and latest victims of such vicious and perpetual) or interfering with the only institution (**PNH**) the officers should pay loyalty. In essence, NEHRO calls for U.S. foreign policy change concerning Haiti, because of long-standing and current U.S. policies applied to Haiti and its American diaspora violate the basic principles of human rights.

Case in point, before leaving his post as Senior Legal Advisor to the State Department, Harold Hongju Koh penned a strongly-worded criticism of President Biden's foreign policies applied to Haiti, on October 2, 2021 (letter attached). The Biden's administration flagrant human rights violations against Haitian migrants disturbed yet another high-ranking U.S. official, Biden's former Special Envoy to Haiti, Daniel Foote on September 22, 2022, who wrote that he refused "to be associated" with Biden's "inhumane" deportation policy (letter attached).

Based on foregoing objections, NEHRO strongly encourages High Commissioner Volker Türk to provide organizational support to its current drive aimed at protecting all human rights for all Haitians at home and abroad, and most importantly to assist in holding accountable those responsible for upholding such rights, in the specific contest on UN resolution 2699.

In fact, it is common practice at the United Nations, to approve a significant number of resolutions, in response to multiple challenges to the very same case. For instance, the UN has allowed about ninety resolutions in the (same) case of the former Yugoslavia. Haiti's current situation will require exceptional and careful considerations, which will necessarily be translated into caducity, new introduction, and eventual renewal(s). Of course, this is not a clear Cyprus case; but the rule of law must prevail.

II. Statement of Facts

Every conundrum needs its intrusive deliverer, even though that deliverer is bound to make things worse.² In Haiti's case, with the overwhelming support manifested by the general population, both Kenyan and Haitian laws prohibit the stratagem concocted by Mr. William Ruto (president of Kenya) and Mr. Ariel Henry (an average Haitian citizen trapped without political cover by a failed president-for-life attempt carried out by U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Eric Stroymayer) to illegally deploy Kenyan paramilitary police officers to Haiti, under the guidance and support of the U.S. Department of State.

In fact, following high-level trips taken by U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken as well as U.S. Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, in support to such arrangement, the High Court of Nairobi ruled in clear and specific terms on January 26, 2024 that the arrangement — serving as legal instrument, with copies of letters exchanged between Parties filed with the UN Secretary General's office to secure approval of Resolution 2699 — was "illegal", "unconstitutional", and "invalid".

² See, K. Wellens des résolutions du CS (Bruylant Bruxelles, 1993, xl+991 p.; and R. Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967, The Middle East, Oxford UP, 1969.

III. Pertinent Considerations

Given that the United Nations Resolution 2699 authorized a Multinational Security Support Mission (MMAS), "**with a lead country [not Kenya expressly], in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of Haiti**", for an initial period of twelve months from the adoption of this resolution [**October 2, 2023**], which authorization will be reviewed nine months after the adoption of said resolution [**July 2, 2024**];

Considering that four (4) months have already elapsed since this decision was taken; and that situations on the ground in Haiti have profoundly and irreversibly changed in manner that all parties failed to anticipate, even after private and public warnings from credible institutions such as Harvard Law School, Yale Law School, and NYU School of Law, in a joint statement from U.S. human rights clinics on the constitutional and human rights crisis in Haiti;

Noticing the absence of any form of Government, an entity specifically required as primary party in Resolution 2699; thereby effectively blocking attempts by any law-binding and honest leader to engage his/her country in discussions with a pretending and audacious ex-Prime Minister, Ariel Henry;

Given that a transitional government must emerge, in lieu of Mr. Eric Stroymayer's misplaced President for-life's proclamation in favor of ex-Prime minister Ariel Henry, for reasons that must be elucidated before the United States' Congress, considering Henry's widely documented trouble with the law (most recently, falsely impersonating public officer or minister [as head of state], during the 46th Regular Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM on and about 26th day of February 224, in Georgetown, Guyana);

Given that representatives of the Kenyan and Haitian governments had knowingly and willfully concealed material facts pertaining to legal violations of both in Haiti and Kenya, through documents submitted as well as statements made in favor of UN resolution 2699;

Noting the failure of high-level diplomatic missions attempting to legitimize an arrangement deemed "illegal", "unconstitutional" and "invalid" by the High Court of Nairobi on January 26, 2024; and continuous attempts to pursue the same goal through the Organization of American States (OAS) and though the latest G-20 audacious amalgam, while Mr. Henry is parked in limbo by Mr. Stroymayer, with a group of ex-ministers: only "ministering" their pay checks under a dubious legal reasoning.

Considering that these diplomatic attempts amount to an act of undue pressure applied to a foreign country's independent judicial system, for reasons that must be elucidated by the U.S. Congress; and that such act does not reflect the values of the United Nations nor the spirit of terms and conditions of UN Resolution 2699;

Noting a significant number of indices of corruption in the arrangement serving as the basis for both (1) Mr. Henry's illegal request (Haiti) and (2) the United States' motion in support of UN Resolution 2699;

Given material facts inseparably linking those convicted of the heinous assassination of president Jovenel Moise and the primary promoters/beneficiaries of UN resolution 2699 (see the court-discarded illegal, unconstitutional, and invalid Ruto-Henry arrangement);

Considering that UN resolution 2699 is essentially based on this defunct arrangement (floating with the incredulous assistance of U.S. State Department from an imaginary "reciprocity" between Kenya and Haiti to the public threat by Mr. RUTO to circumvent both the High Court's legally sound verdict and the Haitian constitution (see follow-up provided by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madame Linda Thomas-Greenfield knowingly and willfully engaged in the illegal activity: endorsing and welcoming Ariel Henry's falsely impersonating a public officer or minister [as head of State]);

Given that ex-Prime minister Ariel Henry's conduct is prohibited in Guyana, through CARICOM, and in the United States, notably in Washington, DC, under Title 22, § 22-1404, Code of the District of Columbia;

Considering, moreover, that the revival of the "OAS option", to keep the Kenyan deal alive, had been weakened by the awkward presence of Mr. Léon Charles, as AOS ambassador in the U.S. capital: a previously fired Police Chief, reinjected with the overt support of the U.S. Department of State, to become the Police Chief on-duty on the day of president Jovenel Moïse's assassination;

Considering that even after being cited as a suspect and subsequently heard by an investigating judge over the assassination of an elected president, placed under his watch (the highest-ranking officer), Mr. Charles enjoyed full support by the Biden administration, as OAS Mission Chief, in Washington, DC.

Considering that intercontinental military power cannot be granted to Kenya to justify its application to OAS, under heavy suspicion of illegal activities confirmed by the High Court's ruling: an unmistakable corruption warning.

Giving Kenya's global positioning distance of 12,000 km away from Haitian shores, in addition to its vertiginous 143/180 ranking among the most corrupt countries on the planet, in 2017 (according to the "Transparency International's (TI) corruption index);

Considering, as such, that any recommendation in favor of Kenya joining the OAS, under the current conditions and circumstances, will clearly amount to the act of incitement to corruption.

Considering that Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield's deep knowledge of the Kenyan political landscape and its actors, for having been posted in Nairobi for an extended period as a U.S. diplomat.

Considering that Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield's recent trip to Guyana, in an overt support to the criminal act of falsely impersonating a public officer or minister, with **ex-Prime Minister** Ariel Henry (as head of State), only a week following another mysterious death in this case: Inspector Walter Nyankieya Nyamato;

Considering that Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield's action constitutes an act of humiliation, violating the Haitian people right to self-determination, in addition to undue pressure her presence applies on legitimate heads of State to "collaborate" an impersonator.

Based on the foregoing, it is reasonable, following consultations with a consortium of human rights organizations, operating within the United States, throughout Europe, and the Caribbean islands, to call on all parties involved or concerned by this dangerously and frivolous crafted resolution 2699 (serving as alibi to a growing list of on-going illegal conducts or criminal conducts) to review and repeal it.

As a result, the United States should reckon with the reality on the ground and secure a legitimate mandate through a new UN resolution that MUST explicitly and clearly offer the following human rights protections, with the much-needed assistance of High Commissioner Volker Türk:

1. Protection against child abuses (e.g., cases of rape affecting young girls and boys recorded during MINUSTAH's terrifying mission) by personnel involved in any UN authorized mission in Haiti;
2. Protection and compensation to children conceived during any UN authorized missions in Haiti;
3. DNA-sampling or alternative policies allowing post-mission identification of serious offenders (a powerful deterrent);
4. An insurance policy subscribed specifically to address the foregoing concerns (given that the Cholera disaster combined with the plight of abandoned children, conceived by MINUSTAH personnel, to amplify such exceptional human rights considerations).

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing evidence, no decision from the Secretary-General of the United Nations is needed to accept the **caducity of UN Resolution 2699**, for:

1. Resolution 2699 is null and void, because of concealed material facts by M. Ruto (Kenya) and M. Henry (Haiti), as confirmed by the High Court of Nairobi on the 26th day of January 2024, thereby misleading the Secretary General as well as National Security Council of the United Nations;
2. Resolution 2699 was based on a bogus legal reasoning, in a clear attempt to circumvent the Haitian Constitution and Kenya's National Police Act, thereby knowing and willfully deceiving the Secretariat-General as well as the UN Security Council;
3. Resolution 2699, even if it were valid, could not possibly apply to the current situation on Haitian soil, in the absence of a legitimate Haitian Government to engage the State;
4. The American unreasonable fixation on Kenya raises too many credible red flags to dissociate the U.S. diplomats involved from the catastrophic failures of Mr. Henry (Haiti) and Mr. Ruto (Kenya);
5. Suspicious last-minute trips to the United States, taken by Mr. Frantz Elbé and Mrs. Emmelie Prophète Milcé, while juggling between Jovenel Moise's assassination case and the pretending "acceleration" of Kenya's deployment;
6. The prison-break attempt orchestrated on February 13, 2024, confirmed legitimate concerns over a hidden agenda to use foreign troops (under the suspects' control) to protect the president's assassins: an indecent proposal to the Kenyan people;
7. The scope of this ill-conceived mission, presented to the Secretary General, by the architects of the Kenyan proposal, no longer matches Haiti's post-February 7th, 2024's reality; as the G-20's fanfare continues to undermine the role officially assigned to CARICOM and BINUH in UN resolution 2699;
8. According to the Code of the District of Columbia, under Tittle 22, Mr. Frantz Elbé et Mrs. Emmelie Prophète Milcé should be very concerned with § 22-1404: **falsely impersonating public officer or minister**. This section clearly targets ex-ministers and officers, acting under UN. Resolution 2699, who "**knowingly attempted to act as any such officers after his or her appointment or commission has expired or he or she has been dismissed from such office, shall suffer imprisonment in the penitentiary...**" (see also § 22-704: Corrupt influence; officials). The sample principle applies to ex-Prime Ariel Henry and his entire Cabinet, regardless of what this erratic Biden administration claims to dissimulate its catastrophic failures beyond Haiti's shores.
9. The same above-cited principle applies squarely to Mr. Henry and CARICOM's Chairman Irfaan Ali, under the CARICOM charter or the national legislations of any of its individual states. As such, Chairman Ali, a very able jurist, and ex-parliamentarian, cannot ignore the universal nature of the principles of fraud, corruption, and false impersonation. The notion of falsely impersonating a public officer or a head of State is anchored in the individual legal regime of every CARICOM member state;
10. Ex-Prime minister Henry's illegal act, of falsely impersonating a head of State, clearly reveals a hidden agenda intended to use foreign troops to support such illegal activities at home and abroad, with the full support of the Biden administration, as Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield's presence on the scene has confirmed; More disturbingly, according to credible information provided by President Biden's own Special Envoy to Haiti, Daniel Foote: *providing foreign troops to Ex-Prime Minister Henry, (a false impersonator of a public officer and minister), under the guise of defunct U.N. resolution 2699, amounts to protecting the assassins of President Jovenel Moise*. U.N. resolution 2699 shall not stand!

V. NEHRO's Complaints and Recommendations

Given unresolved and pending issues before the United Nations, concerning abandoned children conceived by UN mandated foreign troops on Haitian soil (e.g., cases of rape targeting boys and girls and malicious/negligent transmission of Cholera and other diseases), it is appalling to discover that UN resolution 2699 failed yet again to take appropriate measures to address past issues or imminent dangers to our vulnerable children and women. NEHRO is compelled to ask Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield and Secretary Lloyd Austin to take a closer look to this careless *roadmap-to-abuse* of negroes in the Americas, under their watch, during this Black History month celebration in the United States.

We address the same concerns to Ex-Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who participated in crafting and concocting this scheme of "teleguided" fratricide.

Therefore, NEHRO recommends that there should not be any UN resolution regarding Haiti, presented by any UN member, in the absence of consultations with reputable human rights organizations, such as OHCHR and its affiliates, in this exceptional case. There must be express language -- translated in policies that govern troops' activities on Haitian soil -- addressing the specific issues of rape, conceiving children while on-duty, and innocent victims.

There is lack of reference to the law that must govern the conducts of foreign police officers on this purported mission to fight "gangs" by a paramilitary unit. For instance, the definition of "gang" must be provided, and explicit measures must be implemented to deal with cases of fatal mistaken identity of innocent civilians. In addition, a "three-strike-you-are-out" rule would certainly deter offenders with a very strong signal of zero tolerance to killing of innocent civilians.

There should not be any decision taken behind closed doors, concerning Haiti. NEHRO is formally requesting a copy of any pre-draft, in order to consult with other human rights organizations on this specific issue of widely contested deployment of foreign troops to Haiti. Haitian families are unanimous: they plead for protecting little girls and boys and we have respectfully forwarded their desperate call directly to High Commissioner Volker Türk.

The architects of UN Resolution 2699 had failed to offer any protection to Haiti's beautiful young girls and boys. As a result, it must be discarded, for failing to address the documented human rights violations reported *supra*, and most disturbingly, leaving the doors open to obvious abuses with dreadful consequences, as the recent MINUSTAH experience has taught us.

Unfortunately, UN resolution 2699 is a living proof a preprogrammed disaster, recently placed on the agenda of the G-20 meeting, in Brazil. This ill-conceived tentative is likely to fail again: from Port-au-Prince to Nairobi, Rio de Janeiro, Washington, DC (OAS), and Georgetown, Guyana (CARICOM), **the rule of law will continue to prevail, as NEHRO stands by Haitian girls and boys, on the right side of history.**

There is yet another major concern over entrapping upcoming/emerging Haitian leaders into a dubious security agreement, by intimidation and *chantage*. This concern is highlighted by ongoing negotiations kept secret, since February 5, 2024, about the country's fate. The Haitian people is patiently waiting for a consensual government to emerge. Of course, in the absence of any elected officials participating in such "negotiations" guided by "devoted" foreign diplomats on the ground, human rights concerns compels NEHRO to cry for full public disclosure. The continuous refusal by the foreign diplomats, overtly using visa restrictions and financial sanctions, to maintain their negotiations secret, constitutes a hold-up on and a flagrant slap to democracy: a clear violation of the *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* (1961).

Of course, keeping the population informed would necessarily bring relief from psychological pressure built on uncertainty. Conversely, the unnecessary suspense will likely incite violence and lead to pillage. It is an outrageous and very irresponsible act. The U.S. Department of State and M. Biden are respectfully invited to review explicit and clear warnings, issued by a consortium of Harvard, Yale and NYU legal scholars; hence, confirming NEHRO's qualification of such actions knowingly and willfully taken to cause further damages, subtly embedded in UN Resolution 2699. NEHRO respectfully asks the High Commissioner Volker Türk to assist its investigators in getting access the documents, as part of his office's mission to denounce, but most importantly, prevent human rights abuses, in Haiti's compelling case.

In order to measure the gravity of a series of violations arising out this suspicious "Biden-Henry" Washington MOU, one must refer to the following elements of a valid contract, under District of Columbia law:³

1. An intent to be bound;
2. Agreement on all material terms;
3. Assumption of mutual obligations.

Of course, under District of Columbia law, for a contract to be valid, it must contain the material terms of the bargain. The latter are *sine qua non* for the parties to understand what they are promising or how to perform the contract, such as subject matter, price, payment terms, quantity, quality, duration, and so on (Dyer, 983 A.2d at 356-57.)

However, even if the parties intend to be bound by an agreement, the contract is not enforceable unless the court can determine what the parties agreed to do (Strauss v. NewMarket Glob. Consulting Grp., LLC, 5 A.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. 2010) (whether a term is material is a question of fact); 1836 S St. Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. Estate of B. Battle, 965 A.2d 832, 839 (D.C. 2009); Eastbanc, Inc. v. Georgetown Park Assocs. II, L.P., 940 A.2d 996, 1002 (D.C. App. 2008); Duffy, 881 A.2d at 637 (to be enforceable, a contract must be sufficiently definite regarding material terms)).

Hence, NEHRO calls on the U.S. Congress to take swift actions aimed at holding Mr. Biden responsible for actions he continues to take willfully, with total disregard for Black lives around the world. The senseless death of late Police Inspector Walter Nyankieya Nyamoto marks the Biden administration's pattern of ignoring repeated warnings from U.S. Congress and legal experts from Harvard, Yale and NYU, leading up to (a) Jovenel Moise's assassination under his watch, and (b) illegal activities conducted in Kenya in connection to its failed policies (according to Daniel Foote): including the proclamation of Ariel Henry as president-for-life by his lauded Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Eric Stroymayer, thus, **sending a clear message during this Black History Month '2024.**

NEHRO would like to voice these grave concerns to Mayor Muriel Browser's attention on suspicious activities widely reported and documented in the days leading up to signing this mysterious death-tainted MOU established under the instruction and in support of ex-Prime Minister Ariel Henry and his handlers, in Washington, DC., on and about the date of February 13, 2024. As the fate of beautiful Haitian girls and boys is being traded (under rape and torture) for political/financial gain: capped by perpetual foreign interferences as conceded by Special Envoy Daniel Foote and former Brazilian diplomat Edmond Muller (during Haiti's 2016 presidential elections). In fact, based on UN resolution 2699, this MOU, purportedly signed in Washington, will likely maintain the same level of disregard for Haitian brown girls and boys.

The Biden Administration has offered a deadly valentine's present to the Kenyan people and gangs-affiliated, president-for-life imposter, Ariel Henry, to Haitian people: Haiti will remember; Kenya will remember; African Americans will certainly not forget Mr. Biden's documented actions and inactions; proclamations and omissions (as documented throughout this report).

³ See REO Acquisition Grp. v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 104 F. Supp. 3d 22, 28 (D.D.C. 2015) (applying District of Columbia law); SJ Enters., LLC v. Quander, 207 A.3d 1179, 1183 (D.C. 2019); Dyer v. Bilal, 983 A.2d 349, 356 (D.C. 2009.)

Furthermore, under District of Columbia law, the statute of frauds requires certain types of agreements to be in writing and signed by the person against whom enforcement is sought. The types of contracts required to be in writing include:

An agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the date it was made (D.C. Code § 28-3502). Based on the foregoing, Congress should look deep into this matter featuring indices and conducts assimilated to corruption. NEHRO pleads to the U.S. Congress to act, by applying all legal means to force the Biden administration to reckon with Haiti's catastrophic reality (reflecting Mr. Biden's own foreign policy footprints on this country: located in the "Caribbean seas"). Of course, it is in the best interest of the United States that Haiti ceases to be the world's perpetual mirror of failed U.S. policies.

Beyond its moral obligations, the U.S. Congress has the solemn constitutional duty, under **Art.1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. constitution**, to act immediately and order an emergency stay on this desperate, catastrophe-laden move by the Biden Administration, to knowingly concoct a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with false impersonators of a public officer. This MOU is clearly tainted by the mysterious death of Kenyan Police Inspector Walter Nyankieya Nyamoto, at the "Seat of Government of the United States," the living room of the U.S. Congress, and America's own bedroom closet: **District of Columbia**. This is Congress's late wake-up call.

Indeed, the Biden administration has knowingly, willfully, and repeatedly ignored strong Congressional warnings and recommendations, to expose the U.S. Capitol and the entire world to this spectacular and vertiginous parallel between (a) the gruesome, **intimate-bedroom assassination** of sitting President Jovenel Moise, and (b) the mysterious death of Kenyan Police Inspector Nyamoto, deep into America's bedroom closet: **Washington, DC**. Is this Vice-President Kamala Harris and President Joe Biden's gift to all Africans and their offsprings, notably African Americans, during this Black History Month celebration of 2024 (warnings after warnings)?

Given the **caducity of UN Resolution 2699**, the U.S. Department of State should stop interfering with Haitian internal affairs using violence, inhuman treatments, and flagrant disregard for the rule of law. Of course, the U.S. Congress, Special Envoy Daniel Foote, and a cohort of legal scholars from Harvard, Yale and NYU have consistently and rightfully called on President Joe Biden (both privately and publicly) to reverse course. He has consistently refused to do so, putting the entire world on the edge during an election year.

U.S. Congress should launch an independent investigation into for-profit private endeavors, subtly financed by U.S. taxpayers, to exploit and obliterate Haiti, **under the false pretense of strategic U.S. reserves and/or interests**. Given the way Haitians have been treated, both at home and abroad, by the Biden administration, there is absolutely no evidence of U.S. national security interest in Haiti. The strategic national security interest alibi has been debunked and should no longer be recycled by private sector lobbyists, posing as diplomats.

U.S. Congress should investigate overt U.S. trafficking of weapons of war to Haiti as well as documented acts of land grabs by private entities and mercenaries, mainly from the United States, targeting Haiti's natural resources (rare minerals, natural gas, and oil fields), in the wrongful name of U.S. national security, albeit dividends rarely make it to the U.S. treasury. In some cases, other foreign nationals and offshore accounts are routinely used to evade the conveniently outdated Internal Revenue Services (IRS). Simply put, with respect to Haiti: there is no public interest... there is no real U.S. national security concerns ... there is no working U.S. strategy at play (overt or covert), as recent events have clearly displayed U.S. priorities in Ukraine and elsewhere (e.g., on the golf of Eden, in Asia, and Ukraine, to avoid an exhaustive list).

Summing up, as the U.S. Congress seeks to restore trust and revamp a tainted U.S. image, the tragic death of the Kenyan Police Inspector, at the footsteps of Capitol Hill, should empower its members to take bold and concrete actions, compelling the Biden Administration to change its perilous course, and thereby:


1. Order an emergency stay on this tra-ic Biden-MOU, concocted by a handpicked ex-Haitian officials, in apparent violation of District of Columbia’s criminal statutes regulating the matter;
2. Order the full release of the said MOU as well as President Moise's assassination report, in application to the Freedom of Information Act;
3. Schedule hearings (public and/or classified) over U.S. Chargé d'affaires, Eric Stroymayer's role in this conundrum: horrific for Haitians and ambarrassing for the Americans involved;
4. Revisit Daniel Foote's recommendations and put his updated report to use in mutual interests of US-Haiti relations.
5. Accept and support the will of the Haitian people with its widely popular proposal calling for:
 - a. Establishment of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (mutualizing the ressources its own armed forces);
 - b. Neutralization of armed gangs, according to a negotiation/neutralization approach assisted by cheap UAVs (drones) and technical foreign assistance, for there is not a need for boots on ground at this time;
 - c. Installation of a consensual transitional government, for a non-renewable two-year term with:(i) a Judge, issued from Haiti's Cour de Cassation; (ii) the Commander-in-chief of said Joint Chiefs of Staff; (iii) a representative of Haiti's civil society from which political parties emerged; and (iv) a representative of the Haitian private business sector; (v) a representative a religious sector. All regalian institutions can be restored by Feb.7, 2026 (in less than 2 years), as political leaders agree to wait for a fair electoral process, in order play their long-term role.

It is with great confidence that NEHRO investigators challenge the Biden administration to back their claims of absence of consensus over this widely popular proposal. Of course, minor adjustments are needed to render it operational, with a budgeted chronogram of activities. Fritz Jean, alone, can produce such document within 48 hours.

“You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you can not fool all of the people all of the time.”

— Abraham Lincoln (translated by Haitians to the Biden administration in four words: ""**tou manti pa fon!**"")

VI. Is it all about Haiti's rare minerals, oil/natural gas fields?



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DÉFIS HUMANITAIRES

DANS UN MONDE À 10 MILLIARDS D'HUMAINS



Cholera outbreak in Haiti: what responsibilities for the UN?

January 2010, cholera devastates Haiti and makes thousands of deaths. The medical specialist Renaud Piarroux, mandated by the French ambassador to Haiti to help the Haitian Ministry of Health to fight against this epidemic, leaves in November of that same year. However, going back to the sources and causes of cholera, Dr. Piarroux makes a surprising and scandalous discovery. The United Nations will do everything to hide the truth and discredit its conclusions.

It is the chronological account of the events that preceded and followed this discovery that he narrates step by step in his book “**Cholera. Haiti 2010-2018, the story of a disaster**“. A sort of police investigation that will reveal a scandal humanitarian, scientific and political.

THE CONVERSATION

Academic rigour, journalistic flair



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'They put a few coins in your hands to drop a baby in you' - 265 stories of Haitian children abandoned by UN fathers

Published: December 17, 2019 5:43pm CET

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Susan Bartala

Clinician-Scientist, Queen's University, Ontario

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Languages

Franyala

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Marie*was 14)NIB old andemulled.ina ChriBtian schoolwhen shemet andbecame iDvolvedwith Miguel.aBrazilian soldier wor'kinginHaiti u a U N peacekeeper. When she told mmthat shewas pregnant withhis baby,.Miguelsaidhe would help her with the child. ButiDatead, he returned. to Brazil. Mariewrote to him on Facebookbut henever responded.

After learning that she was pregnant, Marie's father forced her to leave the family home and she went to live with her sister. Her child is now four and Marie has yet to receive any support from the Brazilian military, an NGO, the UN or the Haitian state. Marie provides what she can for her son but she cannot afford to send him to school. She works for an hourly wage of 25 gourde (around 26 US cents or 20 UK pence) so that she and her son can eat. But she needs help with housing and paying for school fees.

Sadly, Marie's experience is far from unique. In the summer of 2017, our research team interviewed approximately 2,500 Haitians about the experiences of local women and girls living in communities that host peace support operations. Of those, 265 told stories that featured children fathered by UN personnel. That 10% of those interviewed mentioned such children highlights just how common such stories really are.

The narratives reveal how girls as young as 11 were sexually abused and impregnated by peacekeepers and then, as one man put it, "left in misery" to raise their children alone, often because the fathers are repatriated once the pregnancy becomes known. Mothers such as Marie are then left to raise the children in settings of extreme poverty and disadvantage, with most receiving no assistance.



Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Sylvie Corriveau/Shutterstock

Mired in controversy

The UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) - the longest running mission by the organisation in the country (2004-2017) - was originally mandated to assist local Haitian institutions in a context of political instability and organised crime. Its mandate was then extended due to natural disasters, most notably an earthquake in 2010 and Hurricane Matthew in 2016, both of which added to the volatility of the political situation in the country. After 13 years of operation, MINUSTAH closed in October 2017, transitioning to the smaller UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH).



Lowenstein International
Human Rights Clinic
Yale Law School



Joint Statement from U.S. Human Rights Clinics on the Constitutional and Human Rights Crisis in Haiti

February 13, 2021

As U.S.-based law school clinics working in solidarity with Haitian civil society, we are deeply concerned about the deteriorating human rights situation in Haiti and about the U.S. response to date. Credible evidence shows that President Jovenel Moïse has engaged in a pattern of conduct to create a constitutional crisis and consolidate power that undermines the rule of law in the country. We call on the U.S. government to denounce recent acts by President Moïse that escalate the constitutional crisis.

Over the past week, Moïse has taken several particularly alarming actions that violate the rule of law:

- Moïse’s mandate as president is widely considered to have ended on February 7, 2021, based on an interpretation of the Haitian Constitution¹ endorsed by the [Conseil Supérieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire](#); the [Haitian Bar Federation](#); and many other legal experts and civil society. But Moïse has refused to step down, citing an alternative reading that extends his term to February 7, 2022.

¹ Presidents are elected to a five-year term. Moïse was elected in 2016, in a re-run of the 2015 election. Moïse argues that because he did not take office until 2017, his five-year term runs until February 2022, but this is inconsistent with the Haitian Constitution and the 2015 Electoral Law. The Constitution specifies that the presidential term starts on February 7 after elections are held. HAITI CONST. ART. 134-1, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012.pdf?lang=en (English translation). Article 134-2 further specifies that when elections are delayed, “the president elected enters into his functions immediately after the validation of the ballot and his mandate is considered to have commenced on 7 February of the year of the election.” *Id.* art. 134-2. The 2016 elections were organized pursuant to the 2015 Electoral Law, which specified that the president’s term would end five years from the mandated start date, regardless of when the president actually took office. Electoral Law of 2015, art. 239(a), LE MONITEUR, <https://www.haitilibre.com/docs/decretelectoral2015.pdf> (“The term of office of the President of the Republic shall end on the seventh (7th) of February in the fifth year of his term of office, regardless of the date of his entry into office.”) Moïse previously applied this interpretation to [dismiss](#) all local mayors and most of the Parliament last year, resulting in his ruling by decree without any checks on his power. See Jacqueline Charles, “U.S. lawmakers call for Haiti-led transition, support claim Moïse’s presidency ends Sunday,” MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 2021, <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article249058630.html> It is also consistent with how term lengths have been interpreted by and for prior Haitian presidents whose periods of time in office have, for various reasons, not amounted to five years. See Jake Johnston, “The OAS Picks Sides in Haiti... Again,” *Center for Economic & Policy Research*, June 4, 2020, <https://cepr.net/the-oas-picks-sides-in-haiti-again/>.

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0908

August 9, 2021

President Joe Biden
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We write to express our deep concern with the political and security crisis in Haiti and the heinous assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and attack on First Lady Martine Moïse. Given that Haiti's caretaker authorities have requested our assistance, there is an important role for the United States to play in helping our close neighbor in the aftermath of this tragedy.

We urge your administration to assist the Haitian authorities as they investigate this brutal attack and to cooperate with international partners to ensure justice and accountability for all individuals involved. We further implore your administration, in coordination with international partners, to engage in a diplomatic effort with a broad range of democratic actors across Haitian society to build the consensus and confidence needed to hold credible presidential and parliamentary elections. As part of this effort, the United States should work with the United Nations and partner nations to help address the alarming levels of criminal violence that have terrorized Haiti's population and displaced tens of thousands of people. We recognize that this is a daunting challenge which will not be achieved quickly.

Over the past year, Haiti has experienced a startling rise in criminal activity, kidnappings, human rights violations, and a growing humanitarian crisis. President Moïse's murder is only the latest in a wave of uncontrolled violence. In recent weeks, more than 20 Haitians were killed in Port-au-Prince, including human rights activist Antoinette Duclaire, who was brutally shot to death. We encourage you to aggressively use sanctions and other authorities to deny visas to and freeze the assets of the individuals responsible for these barbaric attacks.

Amidst this climate of violence, the United Nations reports that nearly 650,000 people are displaced throughout the country, including more than 13,000 who were displaced during the month of June. Millions of Haitians lack access to food, water, fuel, and other basic items. Growing popular frustration and the ongoing impact of the COVID-19 pandemic have contributed to a widespread loss of hope in the country and daily street protests. The United States should continue to work with Haitian civil society and the international community to help respond to urgent humanitarian needs while promoting self-reliance.

We strongly support free and fair presidential and legislative elections in Haiti as a necessary step to overcome the current political crisis. However, an electoral process will only be successful if it is deemed credible by the majority of Haitians, meets international standards, and facilitates the participation of a wide range of political and civic actors. Less than 25 percent of Haiti's electorate participated in the country's last elections, underscoring a widespread lack of

trust in the process. We urge your administration to work with our diplomatic partners to engage Haitian political leaders, civil society, the private sector, and traditionally underrepresented populations in order to forge a broader social consensus in support of new elections and a consensus agenda for the current interim government. We believe the integrity and inclusivity of this process is essential to an outcome that has public confidence and support.

Additionally, we firmly believe that a safe and secure environment is essential to ensure that Haitians can actively participate in their country's democratic process. The United States should continue to work with the international community to help the Haitian National Police (HNP) to facilitate acceptable electoral conditions, to fully investigate and prosecute the assassination of President Moise, and improve the professionalism of its force to effectively protect Haitians. Given our geographic proximity to Haiti, the ongoing pandemic, as well as previous instances of mass migration from Haiti, this is a pressing national security concern.

Considering the urgency of the situation, we respectfully request that you accelerate efforts to nominate a new U.S. Ambassador to Haiti. As Ambassador Michele Sison has been nominated for a new position in the State Department, it is imperative that our embassy not have a lapse in leadership during this critical time. As you consider candidates to serve as our next ambassador, we encourage you to select someone with a deep understanding of the country, extensive diplomatic experience responding to crises, and a record of effective collaboration with civil society and multilateral institutions.

Congress has provided billions of dollars in assistance to the Haitian people in response to disasters, both natural and man-made. This assistance has made the U.S. the single largest source of humanitarian assistance to Haiti. This includes assistance for improving access to agricultural markets, preventing and responding to gender-based violence, and improving access to public health services. The United States has also provided support to the Haitian National Police, which increased its force to more than 15,000 officers and built new commissariats in regions previously without a police presence. At the same time, it is important to ensure that our investments do not perpetuate Haiti's dependency on foreign assistance or empower those who have cared more about enriching themselves than improving the lives of the Haitian people.

A safe, prosperous, and democratic Haiti is in the best interest of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. We therefore urge you to stand in solidarity with the Haitian people. We know you share our commitment to help enable the Haitian people to choose their next leaders in a free, fair and transparent manner. We thank you for your attention to this important matter and look forward to working with you to advance and uphold stability and democracy in our hemisphere.

Sincerely,



Marco Rubio
U.S. Senator




Robert Menendez
U.S. Senator



Todd Young
U.S. Senator




Tim Kaine
U.S. Senator



Bill Hagerty
U.S. Senator



Christopher A. Coons
U.S. Senator



Jeffrey A. Merkley
U.S. Senator



Christopher S. Murphy
U.S. Senator




Cory A. Booker
U.S. Senator



Benjamin L. Cardin
U.S. Senator



Jeanne
Shaheen
U.S. Senator



Patrick Leahy
U.S. Senator

The New York Times—Archives

[Maria Abi-Habib](#) is the bureau chief for Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. She has reported from across South Asia and the Middle East for The [New York Times](#). Find her on Twitter: [@abihabib](#)

By [Maria Abi-Habib](#)

- Dec. 12, 2021 Updated 11:38 a.m. ET

PORT-AU-PRINCE — President Jovenel Moïse of Haiti was about to name names.

Before being assassinated in July, he had been working on a list of powerful politicians and businesspeople involved in Haiti’s drug trade, with the intention of handing over the dossier to the American government, according to four senior Haitian advisers and officials tasked with drafting the document.

The president had ordered the officials to spare no one, not even the power brokers who had helped propel him into office, they said — one of several moves against suspected drug traffickers that could explain a motive for the assassination.

When gunmen burst into Mr. Moïse’s residence and killed him in his bedroom, his wife, Martine Moïse — who had also been shot and lay bleeding on the floor, pretending to be dead — described how they stayed to search the room, hurriedly digging through his files.

“That’s it,” they finally declared to one another before fleeing, she told The New York Times in [her first interview](#) after the assassination, adding that she did not know what the gunmen had taken.

Investigators arrived at the crime scene to find Mr. Moïse’s home office ransacked, papers strewn everywhere. In interrogations, some of the captured hit men confessed that retrieving the list Mr. Moïse had been working on — with the names of suspected drug traffickers — was a top priority, according to three senior Haitian officials with knowledge of the investigation.

The document was part of a broader series of clashes Mr. Moïse had with powerful political and business figures, some suspected of narcotics and arms trafficking. Mr. Moïse had known several of them for years, and they felt betrayed by his turn against them, his aides say.

In the months before his death, Mr. Moïse took steps to clean up Haiti's customs department, nationalize a seaport with a history of smuggling, destroy an airstrip used by drug traffickers and investigate the lucrative eel trade, which has recently been identified as a conduit for money laundering.

The Times interviewed more than 70 people and traveled to eight of Haiti's 10 departments, or states, to interview politicians, Mr. Moïse's childhood friends, police officers, fishermen and participants in the drug trade to understand what happened in the last seven months of the president's life that may have contributed to his death. Many of them now fear for their lives as well.

"I would be a fool to think that narco-trafficking and arms trafficking didn't play a role in the assassination," said Daniel Foote, who served as the U.S. special envoy to Haiti before stepping down last month. "Anyone who understands Haiti's politics or economics understands this."

A central figure on Mr. Moïse's list was Charles Saint-Rémy, known as Kiko, two of the Haitian officials tasked with helping draft the dossier said. Mr. Saint-Rémy, a Haitian businessman, has long been suspected by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration of involvement in the drug trade. Notably, he is also the brother-in-law of former President Michel Martelly, who lifted Mr. Moïse out of political obscurity and tapped him to be his successor.

Mr. Martelly, who is considering another run for the presidency, and Mr. Saint-Rémy were hugely influential in Mr. Moïse's government, with a say in everything from who got public contracts to which cabinet ministers got appointed, according to Haitian officials inside and outside his administration. But Mr. Moïse came to feel that they and other oligarchs were stifling his presidency, his aides say.

American officials say that they are looking closely at Mr. Moïse's efforts to disrupt the drug trade and challenge powerful families as motives in the assassination, and they note that Mr. Saint-Rémy emerged as a possible suspect early in the investigation. But they caution that Mr. Moïse threatened many the economic elite, including a number of people with deep criminal connections.

Mr. Martelly and Mr. Saint-Rémy did not respond to a detailed list of questions for this article.

The investigation into Mr. Moïse's killing has stalled, American officials say, and if the assassination is not solved, many Haitians fear it will add to the mountain of

impunity in the country, further emboldening the criminal networks that have captured the state.

Suspected drug and arms traffickers [have long sat in Haiti's Parliament](#). Small planes with contraband frequently land on clandestine airstrips. Haitian police officers have been caught aiding drug smugglers, while judges are regularly bribed to throw cases.

Haiti may now provide the largest route for drugs destined for the United States, but no one knows for sure because the country has become so difficult to police. American law enforcement is unable to run a wiretapping program in the country, or even fully collaborate with its Haitian counterparts, because corruption in the police and judiciary runs so deep, U.S. officials say.

“Anyone involved in drug trafficking here has at least one police officer on their team,” said Compère Daniel, the police commissioner of the Northwest Department of Haiti, a major transit smuggling corridor.

“It is impossible to get police officers to cooperate with me on the field,” he said. “Sometimes they don’t even answer my calls.”

The D.E.A.’s operations in Haiti have also drawn scrutiny. Criticism of the agency has sharpened because at least two of the Haitians suspected of involvement in Mr. Moïse’s assassination [were former D.E.A. informants](#).

In November, the [Senate Judiciary Committee criticized the D.E.A.](#) for corruption allegations that have swirled around its Haiti operations, citing a [Times investigation](#) in August linking Mr. Moïse’s head of palace security to the drug trade. The D.E.A., accused by former agents of mishandling one of Haiti’s biggest drug cases, declined to comment.

‘The True Leader Wasn’t the President’

When Mr. Moïse was chosen by Mr. Martelly in 2014 to be his successor, Mr. Martelly introduced the nation to a supposed outsider with peasant origins, a man of the countryside who had lifted himself out of poverty by running banana plantations.

Mr. Martelly’s associates said he first met Mr. Moïse during a conference and was struck by the entrepreneur’s business acumen.

But the story was misleading: Mr. Moïse had mostly grown up in the capital, several of the original board members of his banana plantation say it was a failure, and Mr. Moïse was already a close associate of Mr. Saint-Rémy and at least one other suspected drug trafficker.

Mr. Moïse, 53 at the time of his assassination, was born in Trou-du-Nord, French for “hole of the North,” an agricultural town that has suffered under decades of government neglect. His father drove a tractor at a nearby sisal plantation but lost his job when it closed, according to interviews with local residents.

When Mr. Moïse was 7, his mother moved him and his siblings to Carrefour, a slum of Port-au-Prince, in search of work and a secondary school for her children, relatives said. In university, Mr. Moïse met his wife and they moved together to her hometown, Port-de-Paix, in the northwest.

By 2000, Mr. Moïse had met and become business partners with Evinx Daniel, according to relatives and acquaintances of both men. Mr. Daniel, a close friend of Mr. Martelly’s, would later be accused of drug trafficking.

Mr. Moïse worked with Mr. Daniel on one of his ventures, Mariella Food Products, which produced biscuits [with a pigtailed schoolgirl](#) on the packaging. A former high-ranking Haitian police officer said the company was suspected of being a money laundering front.

The full extent of Mr. Moïse’s involvement in the company is unclear, but a former senator, Jean Baptiste Bien-Aimé, recalled the men coming to his office to talk about the company about a decade ago, and said the men were often with Mr. Saint-Rémy, the brother-in-law of Mr. Martelly.

“They were always together. They were fish crushed in the soup,” said Mr. Bien-Aimé, using a local saying to describe close relationships.

Mr. Saint-Rémy has publicly admitted that he sold drugs in the past but claims all his businesses are now legitimate. Haitian law enforcement officials and former D.E.A. officers who recently served in Haiti say he is still believed to be one of the country’s biggest drug traffickers.

Jacques Jean Kinan, Mr. Moïse’s cousin, said he and Mr. Moïse worked with Mr. Saint-Rémy in the eel industry.

With his brother-in-law as president, Mr. Saint-Rémy wielded enormous influence, often demanding that choice licenses and contracts be awarded to him, particularly eel export licenses, according to officials in Mr. Martelly’s government.

When his demands were not heeded, he could turn violent: In 2015, Mr. Saint-Rémy assaulted an agriculture minister for issuing a contract without his consent,

an altercation [reported at the time](#) and confirmed by a former government minister.

As Mr. Saint-Rémy's hold on the eel trade solidified, Mr. Moïse decided to get out of the sector and focus on Agritrans, a banana plantation near his hometown.

“My father said that the Martelly family cornered the eel business and made it difficult to get in,” said Joverlein Moïse, the slain president's son.

Mr. Moïse also kept in touch with his associate, Mr. Daniel, who had opened a hotel in Les Cayes, a coastal city in the south, an official and a relative said.

In 2013, Mr. Daniel told the authorities that he found 23 packages of marijuana floating at sea while he was on his boat and decided to bring them home. Mr. Daniel [said at the time](#) that he and Mr. Saint-Rémy called the D.E.A. to pick up the load he discovered.

A prosecutor, Jean Marie Salomon, doubted the story, suspecting it was a ploy to cover up a drug deal gone bad after locals had stumbled on the stash. He arrested Mr. Daniel on drug-trafficking charges, but he said Mr. Martelly's minister of justice personally intervened and ordered his release.

Shortly after, Mr. Martelly went to Mr. Daniel's hotel with a delegation in a clear display of support, Mr. Salomon said. “The message was, justice does not matter,” he said.

Just months after his release, Mr. Daniel went missing in 2014, his abandoned car found at a gas station. Two people — a relative of Mr. Daniel's and a police officer at the time — said Mr. Moïse was one of the last people to see him alive. Mr. Daniel is presumed dead.

Mr. Salomon suspects that drug traffickers killed him, concerned that he would expose their network as part of a plea deal, and Mr. Daniel's disappearance remains unsolved. Two investigators said they were sidelined by a federal police unit controlled by Mr. Martelly's government that took over the investigation and tampered with the evidence.

Barred by the Constitution from running for two consecutive terms, Mr. Martelly began looking for a successor. He wanted to find someone to keep the bench warm for him until he could launch another presidential bid and shield himself from [corruption allegations](#) involving the misappropriation of billions of dollars during his tenure, according to former officials in the Martelly and Moïse administrations.

He settled on Mr. Moïse, marketing him as a successful entrepreneur and nicknaming him the “Banana Man” on the campaign trail.

“I told Martelly, you have to look for the peasant vote, someone who looks like them, someone with black skin,” said a former senator, Jacques Sauveur Jean, a friend and sometimes political ally of Mr. Martelly. He said Haitians were tired of the privileged light-skinned elite who ran the country, like Mr. Martelly, and felt that Mr. Moïse, with his dark skin and rural origins, better represented them.

In interviews, three of the original board members of Mr. Moïse’s plantation business, Agritrans, described the venture as a failure, with their original investments lost and little but a barren field to show for it.

But as Mr. Martelly contemplated a successor, the company [received a \\$6 million loan from the government.](#)

Esther Antoine, one of Mr. Moïse’s campaign managers, said she worked to polish his image, to get rid of a stutter that had haunted him and improve his confidence onstage. But on the campaign trail Mr. Martelly took center stage, she said, outshining the man he was supposed to be promoting.

Ms. Antoine, who worried that Mr. Martelly’s outsize presence was “drowning” her candidate, said she convinced the president to give Mr. Moïse the space to campaign alone. That did not sit well with Mr. Martelly’s wife, Sophia, she said.

She said the first lady grew suspicious of Ms. Antoine and called her to the Martelly family home in the middle of the night, reprimanding her for not informing them of Mr. Moïse’s every move.

Ms. Antoine said she pushed back, arguing that she was there to work for Mr. Moïse, not the Martelly family.

“That’s when the wife looks at me and says, ‘Jovenel is a property. You don’t seem to understand that,’” Ms. Antoine recounted. “I was shocked. When I asked her to repeat it, she then switched to French: ‘Jovenel est une propriété.’”

The former first lady did not respond to a detailed list of questions for this article.

When he won and took over the presidency in 2017, Mr. Moïse felt suffocated by Mr. Martelly but remained loyal to him, his aides said.

Mr. Moïse was unable to choose his own cabinet without the approval of the Martelly family or Mr. Saint-Rémy, they said. The Martellys would often call Mr. Moïse, yelling at him for his legislative initiatives, according to several people who overheard the conversations.

“The true leader wasn’t the president,” said Gabriel Fortuné, a close adviser to Mr. Moïse who died in an earthquake a day after speaking with The Times. “It was his godfather, Martelly. When we talk about the godfather we are talking about the Italian way,” he added, “the family.”

Ms. Antoine acknowledged that Mr. Moïse often turned a blind eye to the corruption in his government, to avoid making enemies and advance his own initiatives.

“He would say, ‘Let me feed them so they leave me alone. If they’re making money, they’ll let me do my electricity and build my roads,’” Ms. Antoine recalled him saying.

But Mr. Moïse’s critics said he joined in the corruption. Before he came to power, the Haitian government was investigating Mr. Moïse, his wife and their company, Agritrans, for large amounts of money found in their bank accounts that could not be explained by the level of business they were generating, an official who worked on the case said.

Two government anti-corruption units also questioned why Mr. Martelly’s government gave a \$6 million loan to Agritrans, a company with such a limited record. But when Mr. Moïse came to power, he [fired the directors of the two anti-corruption units](#) who worked on the inquiry.

‘They Will Kill Me’

As Mr. Moïse settled into office, he soon realized that the withering control Mr. Martelly and his family exerted on the campaign trail extended to his personal security, several officials said.

Mr. Moïse inherited Dimitri Hérard, a pivotal member of Mr. Martelly’s presidential security force who became the head of the police unit protecting Mr. Moïse’s presidential palace.

Mr. Hérard was also a drug-trafficking suspect. In 2015, when a Panamanian-flagged cargo ship docked in Port-au-Prince with 1,100 kilograms of cocaine and heroin aboard, [Mr. Hérard was seen commanding police officers](#) in uniform to load the drugs into vehicles before speeding off with them, according to a witness and Keith McNichols, a former D.E.A. agent stationed in Haiti who led the agency’s investigation into the missing drug shipment.

But Mr. Martelly shielded Mr. Hérard from being questioned by investigators in the case, a former United Nations official said.

Mr. Moïse deeply mistrusted Mr. Hérard, according to several presidential advisers and an international diplomat the president confided in. On at least one occasion, they said, Mr. Hérard was found spying on the president for Mr. Saint-Rémy, informing him about Mr. Moïse's meetings.

Mr. Hérard, now in detention as a suspect in the assassination, could not be reached for comment.

In January, Mr. Hérard ordered about 260 weapons from Turkey — including M4 carbines and handguns — making out the order to the presidential palace, Mr. Fortuné and a former security official said. But instead of arming his own unit, they said, Mr. Hérard sold most of the weapons to gangs and businesses.

“When Moïse found out about the weapons Hérard ordered, he wasn't surprised — he was scared,” Mr. Fortuné said.

Mr. Moïse's relationship with the presidential security forces, already on tenterhooks, further soured. But that changed in February, when Mr. Hérard claimed to have foiled a coup attempt against Mr. Moïse. Suddenly, the distrust waned. Some former aides, like Ms. Antoine and Mr. Fortuné, wondered whether the supposed coup was a false flag, to throw off Mr. Moïse's suspicions about Mr. Hérard.

After the coup scare, Mr. Moïse went on the offensive, publicly blasting Haiti's oligarchs and political elite for trying to kill him, including in one of his [final interviews with The Times](#) before his death.

Behind the scenes, Haitian officials say, Mr. Moïse began working to take down his perceived enemies. He spoke with his closest aides and select officials to start compiling the dossier breaking down narcotics and weapons smuggling networks in Haiti, including Mr. Saint-Rémy, according to the people involved with the document.

In February, Josua Alusma, the mayor of Port-du-Paix and a close Moïse ally, ordered a crackdown on the eel trade, the industry dominated by Mr. Saint-Rémy. Many of the eels go to China, but the Haitian police are investigating the industry as a way to launder illicit profits.

“I don't like this business. It happens at night, do you know what I'm saying?” Mr. Alusma said. “There's no security.”

He said the industry needed to be regulated and taxed. “People like Kiko go in and out of the city,” he said, using Mr. Saint-Rémy's nickname. “But we are the ones here cleaning his trash,” he added, referring to illegal weapons seized during a raid this year.

The same month, the president also started to discuss plans to nationalize a seaport owned by allies of Mr. Martelly, where several shipments of illegal weapons have been found and seized over the years, two senior Haitian officials said.

“Jovenel told me that he had an agenda that he wanted to implement but he couldn’t because, he said, “They will kill me,”” recounted a powerful politician who served as an informal aide to Mr. Moïse, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of his life. The port, he said, “was part of the plan.”

Mr. Moïse also tried to push customs, despite considerable resistance, to start inspecting Mr. Saint-Rémy’s shipments and charging taxes on his goods, according to several presidential aides, two senior security officials and an official at the customs department. Haitian economists estimate that the country loses about \$500 million a year because of corruption at customs.

Then, in mid-May, [Dominican security forces arrested Woodley Ethéart](#), also known as Sonson Lafamilia, a close friend of Mr. Martelly and Mr. Saint-Rémy’s. When Mr. Martelly was president in 2015, he stood by Mr. Ethéart after he was arrested on kidnapping charges.

This year, Mr. Ethéart still had a warrant out for his arrest and generally kept a low profile. But in May, he and Mr. Martelly took photos of themselves partying together in Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic’s capital, that were posted on social media, a senior Dominican official said.

The next day, [Dominican forces arrested Mr. Ethéart](#) and extradited him to Haiti.

Mr. Moïse was ecstatic, his aides said.

The president’s phone buzzed with calls from Mr. Martelly and Mr. Saint-Rémy, but he refused to answer them, according to a close friend and a presidential adviser.

“Sonson Lafamilia is very close to the Martelly family,” said Joverlein, Mr. Moïse’s son. “It is possible that Martelly saw that arrest as some kind of disrespect, that my father was a traitor and was betraying the Martelly family.”

Drug trafficking routes in Haiti’s north also came under pressure. In the 1990s, little Cessna planes from Colombia landed on dirt airstrips on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. But as the population expanded, the landing strips became surrounded by slums. Poor residents realized the valuable illicit cargo the planes held and began raiding them, according to a security official.

So, about a decade ago, traffickers moved the airstrips north, to Savane Diane, a sprawling, isolated area. Since then, the drug trade has evolved and boomed. The planes no longer come solely from Colombia — Venezuela has become a big player, too, with family members of President Nicolás Maduro [arrested by the D.E.A. in Haiti in 2015](#) for drug trafficking. The [son of Hondu ras's former president](#) was also arrested in Haiti by the D.E.A.

This year, Mr. Moïse [approved an agro-industrial zone in Savane Diane](#), but when the project broke ground, officials found they were about three miles south of one of Haiti's most active airstrips for cocaine and heroin deliveries.

The small lake nearby was filled with fish, in an area where malnutrition is rampant, yet locals would not go near it. When The Times asked them why, farmers explained that human remains were often dumped there.

And when The Times went to the local airstrip, a farmer with a machete in his hand approached, asking if a drug delivery was happening so that he could get a bribe to look the other way.

Two jagged dirt strips — one path for each wheel — cut through waist-high grass. Yards from the airstrip lay the hull of a small plane that, residents say, crashed over the summer. The wreckage of another charred plane lay close by.

When the police cars that are often seen offloading the planes' cargo get stuck along the rough roads, local tractor drivers get paid a few dollars to tow them out, residents said. Before a plane comes, they added, farmers cut the grass around the airstrip and start fires in empty cans so pilots know where to land at night.

Mr. Moïse's aides said he became aware of the airstrip after a furious call from the D.E.A.

Between May and June, the airstrip in Savane Diane and another in Haiti's north hosted an inordinate amount of traffic, with at least a dozen planes coming through, potentially carrying thousands of kilos of cocaine, Haitian security officials say. In mid-June, the D.E.A. called the Haitian authorities, demanding to know why there was such an uptick, according to Haitian officials with knowledge of the communication.

Several of the planes had even stopped in Port-au-Prince to refuel in the middle of the night, when the airport was closed, they said.

When Mr. Moïse found out about the deliveries in mid-June, he was fuming, his aides said. Then came an order from the presidential palace: Destroy the airstrip.

But the local authorities refused to do it, according to several officials interviewed.

About a week later, Mr. Moïse was at home with his wife and two children when hit men burst into his home. They had been let into the presidential compound by Mr. Hérard's forces. In his initial testimony, Mr. Hérard said they stood down when the gunmen identified themselves as D.E.A. agents.

Not a single shot was fired between the assassins and Mr. Moïse's guards. As the gunmen stormed the residence, the president called Mr. Hérard and another security official to rescue him, his widow told The Times. No help came.

One of the men leading the assassins, Joseph Felix Badio, was a former D.E.A. informant who called the country's new prime minister, Ariel Henry, [multiple times in the days just before and the hours right after the assassination](#), according to a copy of the police report. Mr. Henry, a close ally of Mr. Martelly, has denied any involvement in the killing.

Mr. Badio is still on the loose, but in the weeks after the assassination he was seen in bulletproof government vehicles, according to a security officer who was involved in the investigation.

Mr. Henry has stripped the government of Mr. Moïse's former allies. Last month, he appointed a new justice minister, Berto Dorcé — who, according to a D.E.A. investigation, bribed one of the judges overseeing the case of the Panamanian-flagged vessel with 1,100 kilos of drugs aboard. A former senior Haitian law enforcement official also said Mr. Dorcé once spent months in jail in connection with drug trafficking.

Mr. Dorcé did not answer a list of questions for this article. Mr. Martelly is in Miami, where he lives, mulling another presidential run, his associates say.


National elections will be held next year, and Mr. Martelly is considered a front-runner.

Julian Barnes contributed reporting from Washington.

Communications

While some exchanges seem obvious - people working in the same company or structure - others seem circumstantial and inconclusive, and are not proof of a conspiracy. Moreover, prime contacts are missing from investigative reports*.

Who called or was called by Jovenel MOISE, his wife, two of their children & personnel - all present inside the house during the attack?
 Who called or was called by his Prime Minister, Justice Minister, or Interior Minister, Haiti's Chief of Police or the Head of the USGPN unit - just to name a few ?



MAJOR COMMUNICATIONS
 ranging from January 2021 up to July 7, 2021 - cited in PNH* and RNDH** investigative reports

- Wanted by PNH
 - Haitian Police (PNH) members
 - Alleged conspirators
 - Corvington Courier & Security Service (CCSS) staff
 - Other individuals
 - Little to nothing known about their communications around July 7, 2021
- *Communications according to **Bureau des Affaires Criminelles (BAC) - Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire (DCPJ) - Police Nationale d'Haiti (PNH)**, "Rapport d'enquête partiel sur l'assassinat du Président Jovenel MOISE", August 2, 2021
- **Communications according to **Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDH)**, "Six mois après l'assassinat tragique de Jovenel MOISE : Aucun supplément d'enquête de police judiciaire - Aucune instruction judiciaire", January 6, 2022



GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT

1612 K Street, NW, Suite #1100

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 457-0034 | info@whistleblower.org

May 1, 2019

Honorable Henry Kerner
Special Counsel
U.S. Office of Special Counsel
1730 M Street, NW, #300
Washington, DC 20036
Attn: [REDACTED]

Re: OSC File Nos. DI-06-1098, DI-18-1075

Dear Mr. Kerner:

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] submit this comment on the September 6, 2018 response (Report) by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Drug Enforcement administration (DEA) to their whistleblowing disclosures of illegality, abuse of authority, gross mismanagement and a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety at the DEA's Port-au-Prince Country Office. (PAPCO) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] specific remarks are enclosed as Attachments (Att.) 1 and 2.

The whistleblowers disclosed evidence demonstrating that for a decade PAPCO had not actively trained or overseen Haiti's (BLTS) drug police on how to investigate and act against seaport smuggling, specifically illicit drugs such as heroin and cocaine often bound for the United States. Second, they disclosed that DEA personnel were complicit with BLTS in obstructing the seizure and investigation of some 700-800 kilos of cocaine and 300 kilos of heroin discovered by accident in April 2015 on the cargo ship Manzanares when it docked at Port-au-Prince.

On balance, they exposed extremely serious damage from the mission breakdown in Haiti: despite a steady high volume flow of drugs, for over a decade there has neither been proactive BLTS training for seaport smuggling, nor until Manzanares a significant seaport smuggling arrest at Port au Prince, Haiti. More specifically, their evidence demonstrates that former Country Attaches (CA) Shawn Alexander and Michael Wilhite, with passive and active support from current Caribbean Assistant Special Agent in Charge James Doby and others within DEA Caribbean Division management, have been responsible for the DEA mission breakdown.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] made a high stakes disclosures with serious consequences for United States citizens. The impact is that because DEA has been looking the other way, for over a decade Port au Prince has been a safe port to ship heroin and cocaine without interference through Haiti, generally destined for Florida in the United States.

Unfortunately, DOJ did not treat the issues with respect, either for its responsibilities under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), or for the associated threat to public health and safety. Instead of taking responsibility as required by 5 USC § 1213(c), the Attorney General delegated the issue to hopelessly-conflicted DEA staff whose Report was forwarded by an Acting DEA Administrator. DEA avoided even mentioning Mr. Doby's name, although he was the active or passive decision-maker for ongoing alleged misconduct.

The Report is fundamentally incomplete. It did not make bottom line conclusions about either of the two issues referred for investigation. It skipped sub-issues in the referral. It skipped making conclusions required by the WPA in 5 USC § 1213(d) and unavoidable from the record, such as apparent illegality. When it made conclusions, without exception the Report rejected allegations of misconduct, generally with unsupported references to evidence neither presented nor summarized. At the same time it ignored and repeatedly denied the existence of probative, specific evidence from the whistleblowers that contradicted its conclusions. It disclosed no institutional corrective action, even failing to Report accountability that the agency has taken secretly.

The message of this Report is that Whistleblower Protection Act disclosures are irrelevant. The Report is only significance as a resource to shield those responsible for the wrongdoing. This is almost ironic to the point of embarrassment, because DEA has become the lone holdout defending its record. Through ██████████ persistence, a new, public-spirited Country Attaché, congressional pressure and in-depth investigative journalism, the tide appears to be turning in the Manzanares investigation. With the new CA's support, ██████████ has been able to secure critical evidence, and the US Attorney's Office (USAO) in Miami is actively investigating the case.¹

Yet the DEA's Caribbean management remains in denial and to date continues to undermine and obstruct the progress of the on-going investigation. This is unacceptable. The point of WPA disclosures is enabling agency leadership to take responsibility, not to deny the obvious. The Special Counsel should not accept this Report as complete or reasonable, and should send it back to the Attorney General with specific guidance for a genuinely independent investigation.

¹ Senators Rubio, Nelson, and Grassley and the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee all intervened. Senator Rubio's letter is enclosed as Attachment 4. A *Miami Herald* article reflected in-depth investigative reporting and confirmation of the whistleblowers' concerns. <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article215793990.html>.



The Special Counsel

U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL
1730 M Street, N.W., Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20036-4505

July 30, 2021

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Subject: OSC File Nos. DI-16-1098, DI-18-1075

Dear Mr. President:

I am forwarding to you a report provided to the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) in response to disclosures of wrongdoing at the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Port-au-Prince, Haiti Country Office. Because the DEA is a component of the Department of Justice, OSC referred the allegations to then Attorney General Jeff Sessions for investigation pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1213(c) and (d). The Attorney General delegated the responsibility for conducting the investigation and signing the report to the DEA Administrator. DEA's Office of Global Enforcement conducted the original investigation and issued a report with the coordination and assistance of the agency's Office of Chief Counsel and Inspections Division. In response to OSC's request for additional information, the Acting DEA Administrator issued a supplemental report¹ based on further investigation by the DEA's Operations Division. I have reviewed the agency report and whistleblower comments, and in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 1213(e), provide the following summary of the report, the whistleblowers' comments, and my findings. As summarized below, I have determined that the DEA's findings and report are unreasonable.

The Whistleblowers' Allegations

The whistleblowers, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], who consented to the release of their names, are former DEA Special Agents who worked in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. They disclosed to OSC that the DEA Port-au-Prince, Haiti Country Office failed to take appropriate measures to implement an effective seaport security program to appropriately assist Haiti with strengthening its counter-narcotics law enforcement program. They also disclosed that DEA failed to properly conduct its investigation of the 2015 M.V. *Manzanares* drug seizure.² Specifically, the whistleblowers raised concerns regarding (1) inadequate training of Haitian law enforcement; (2) inadequate office space and equipment, such as surveillance cameras, at Haitian seaports; (3) insufficient vetting of Haitian law enforcement partners; and (4) inadequate support for the *Manzanares* investigation.

¹ The original report and supplemental report collectively comprise the agency report.

² The M.V. *Manzanares* is a cargo ship from which Haitian authorities seized a large cache of drugs hidden in its hold in April 2015.

DEA's Investigation and Original Report

DEA did not substantiate the whistleblowers' allegations. Specifically, the agency concluded that it had provided adequate training to Haitian law enforcement, including nine training seminars held in Port-au-Prince, Haiti in the last five years and ad-hoc, hands-on training. It reported that the U.S. Coast Guard Defense Attaché, rather than DEA, is responsible for assessing port security measures in Haiti. It stated that while there were limits to how much input U.S. government agencies can have over Haitian port security, DEA, in conjunction with the Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), has been involved with some improvements. It reported that, currently, a group of Haitian law enforcement officers has a permanent office located in a shipping container at the port and Haitian law enforcement has a presence in the port 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. In its report, DEA explained that a "trusted police unit" was created in Haiti in 2016 through an interagency agreement with INL, but that the Haitian counter-narcotics law enforcement unit was not considered a formal "vetted unit." The report stated that DEA removed the Haitian law enforcement commander of that unit in 2018 after the current Port-au-Prince Country Attaché requested his removal due to corruption concerns. DEA did not find sufficient evidence to support the whistleblowers' allegation that DEA denied resources for the *Manzanares* investigation.

In their comments on DEA's report, the whistleblowers criticized the agency for failing to take their disclosures seriously and contended that the report failed to address the issues referred for investigation. They further asserted that DEA had a conflict of interest in investigating its own operations. The whistleblowers also stated that the training DEA has provided to Haitian law enforcement is insufficient and ineffective to ensure basic knowledge of seaport law enforcement and that DEA misrepresented management's responses to the whistleblowers' requests for training by stating in the report that the whistleblowers failed to provide specific examples of formal training requests that were denied. As to the whistleblowers' allegations regarding inadequate equipment, DEA reported that it requested an x-ray machine for Haitian law enforcement at the seaport, but the whistleblowers noted they still do not have one. The whistleblowers criticized DEA for claiming, without support, that the local law enforcement that it works with in Haiti is not a "vetted unit" and believe that DEA's response to corruption concerns about the Haitian law enforcement commander had been slow.³ The whistleblowers also disputed DEA's conclusion that it has pursued the *Manzanares* investigation appropriately. Specifically, they criticized DEA for ignoring evidence about a manager conspiring with a Haitian law enforcement commander to destroy evidence, not permitting pursuit of appropriate leads, and inappropriately deactivating confidential sources.

³ One of the whistleblowers claims to have reported back in 2015 that the Haitian commander at issue failed a polygraph test and DEA did not seek his removal until 2018.

DEA's Supplemental Report

At OSC's request, DEA provided a supplemental report to address the whistleblowers' comments. In that report, the agency explained the steps it took to investigate the whistleblowers' allegations and reiterated that, despite seaport security being outside the mission or responsibility of DEA, the agency nonetheless engaged in efforts to improve port security. In response to the question about additional scanning and x-ray equipment, DEA inexplicably stated that it did not have any record of the current status of the request, much less that it was approved. In response to the whistleblowers' concerns about the DEA conducting the investigation of its own operations, DEA claimed that no conflict existed because the Office of Chief Counsel had limited involvement with, and influence on, the investigation, without addressing the roles of the Office of Global Enforcement and Inspections Division charged with investigating the whistleblowers' allegations. With regard to the whistleblowers' allegation that a DEA official conspired with Haitian law enforcement to destroy drug evidence seized from the *Manzanares*, DEA stated that, while there were different opinions about whether the seized drugs should have been destroyed, Haitian officials had the authority to destroy the drugs and coordinated with DEA regarding the destruction process—indeed the DEA reimbursed Haitian officials \$1,500 for costs associated with the destruction of the drugs. DEA continues to investigate the *Manzanares* seizure and is coordinating with the United States Attorney's Office regarding potential criminal charges.

In response to the supplemental report, the whistleblowers asserted that DEA ignored the additional information they provided. The whistleblowers also criticized the agency for allowing the destruction of evidence and for failing to explain why a DEA official paid Haitian law enforcement to destroy drug evidence seized from the *Manzanares*. The whistleblowers contend that the Office of Chief Counsel's involvement in the investigation created a conflict of interest and that, contrary to DEA's assertions, its involvement impacted the findings. The whistleblowers also commented that the DEA's assertions regarding its limited role in Haiti do not withstand scrutiny and that the supplemental report confirmed that DEA is unwilling to take responsibility or consider the need for corrective action against the unimpeded flow of illegal drugs through Haiti.

OSC's Determination

OSC acknowledges that DEA's role in promoting seaport security in Haiti is limited, given that DEA is operating in a foreign country and the U.S. Coast Guard has primary responsibility for coordinating maritime security. However, since the U.S. government expends resources for DEA to operate in Haiti, it is incumbent on the agency to be as effective as possible in its mission to disrupt the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. DEA's apparent position that, because of its limited role, it is not accountable for the effectiveness of its work in Haiti, is not reasonable. In its reports, DEA does not adequately explain why it did not provide additional training and resources for seaport security and does not clarify whether DEA ever received the screening equipment it requested. Nor does it adequately explain DEA's payment for the destruction of drugs in the *Manzanares* investigation, which it claims is still open. Moreover, DEA failed to explain why there was a significant delay in severing ties with a corrupt Haitian

The President
July 30, 2021
Page 4 of 4

official. Accordingly, I cannot determine that the agency's findings are reasonable. I urge DEAuto more closely review its operations in Haiti and implement measures to improve its effectiveness.

As required by 5 U.S.C. § 1213(e)(3), OSC has sent copies of the agency report, this letter, and the whistleblowers' comments to the Chairs and Ranking Members of the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary. OSC also has copies of these documents and a copy of the original referral letter in our public file, which is available at www.osc.gov. This matter is now closed.

Respectfully,



Henry J. Kerner
Special Counsel

Enclosures

I-39. Letter of U.S. OSC transmitted to President Joe Biden citing all drug dealers involved in the Manzanares and connected to the government firmly supported by the Biden-Harris administration – even after Biden received the letter. Why?